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 Until 1865 division over slavery obscured a general need 
for uniform law that was growing parallel to the development 
of modern means of transportation and communication. In 
1776 travel was rare; commerce among component states was 
 
 
I.  
 
Overview 
 
 Uniformity of law figures prominently in the first cen-
tury of American federalism. Just thirteen years after the Decla-
ration of Independence of 1776, the United States of America 
abandoned its first constitution and adopted a new one that 
provided for more uniform law. The Constitution of 1789, 
however, recognized and perpetuated, a non-uniform law of 
slavery. To abolish that non-uniform law of slavery the country 
fought the bloody Civil War (1861-1865). With abolition of sla-
very, the United States rejected the idea that component states 
might have fundamentally different social, economic, or politi-
cal systems. 
 
                                               
∗ © 2008, James R. Maxeiner, J.D., Cornell; LL.M., Georgetown; Ph.D. in Law, Lud-
wig Maximilian University (Munich, Germany).  Associate Professor of Law and 
Associate Director, Center for International and Comparative Law, University of 
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of minor importance. Within a century, all that had changed. 
Merchants carried on trade in every state; citizens of all states 
established relations with each other. The founding in 1878 of 
the American Bar Association well marks the national need: the 
first article of the Association’s constitution made a first pur-
pose of the association “uniformity of legislation throughout 
the Union.” 
 
Before the Civil War representatives acting for 
component states negotiated political solutions to this one great 
national issue of disharmonious legislation. They left largely 
unattended other issues of uniform law. The principal role of 
the national United States Supreme Court was to preserve 
against particularistic state intrusion areas for federal 
legislation. Political realities ruled out political solutions to 
national needs for uniform law.  
Prior to the Civil War Supreme Court Justice Joseph 
Story despaired that the nation was “perpetually receding 
farther and farther from the common standard.”1 The divisive 
issue of slavery in effect required seeking uniform law through 
means that were less-overtly political. Story himself used a 
variety of ways to promote uniform law. He authored 
important court decisions that gave uniform federal law 
preëminence. He wrote commentaries that formed the basis of 
harmonized state law.2
After the Civil War, with the issue of slavery resolved, 
the nation could give attention to the importance of uniform 
law for the rapidly growing commerce among the states. No 
longer, however, did representatives acting for component 
 He chaired one of the first major reports 
on codification. He taught at the first truly national law school. 
                                               
1 Joseph Story, Progress of Jurisprudence, An Address Delivered Before the Members of the 
Suffolk Bar, at Their Anniversary, at Boston (Sept. 4, 1821), in THE MISCELLANEOUS 
WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 198, 213, 224 (William W. Story ed., 1852). 
2 And this American legal writers did from the earliest of publications. See, e.g., 
AMERICAN PRECEDENTS OF DECLARATIONS iii-iv (1802) (“the work, though more 
immediately applicable to the practice of New-England, may be considered as 
adapted by form, and qualified by authority, to invite the attention and meet the 
necessities of every State in the Union.”). 
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states negotiate political solutions to these needs. Instead, 
shifting coalitions of interested parties persuaded the central 
government or the individual component states to adopt 
uniform or harmonized legal rules. No longer was the principal 
role of the national United States Supreme Court in legal 
unification to determine what states could do without 
infringing federal prerogatives; it became to decide what the 
central government might do without violating states’ rights.  
 
Two post-Civil War developments mightily furthered 
this more expansive federal role. The post-Civil War amend-
ments to the Constitution, especially the fourteenth amend-
ment of 1868 assuring rights of citizenship and due process 
throughout the Union, resulted in new, expansive powers for 
the federal government. Meanwhile, the ever growing 
commerce among the component states led the central 
government to seek to satisfy those needs with greater federal 
involvement. At first slowly, and then decisively with the 
development of the administrative state in the “New Deal” of 
the 1930s, the Supreme Court acquiesced in an expanded role 
of the central government. 
 
 Today, the picture of federalism remains much the same 
as that which developed in the the century following the Civil 
War: consensus based approaches that do not involve govern-
ments negotiating with each another. These are principally 
three: 
 
(1) The central government, relying on pre-existing 
federal powers, adopts laws that apply nationwide. These 
federal laws usually do not displace state law completely. The 
component states, to the extent necessary, adjust their laws to 
coordinate with national laws. 
 
(2) The component states, either in imitation of the law 
of one leading state or of the federal government or following 
uniform and model laws proposed principally by the National 
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Law (founded 
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by the states in 1892) or the American Law Institute (founded 
by academic and practicing lawyers in 1923), adopt 
substantially similar laws. 
 
(3) Both the central government and the component 
states in the interest of national harmony rely on third party 
harmonization through “restatements” of law and other 
academic and non-binding interpretations of laws as well as on 
decisions of private, national-standards setting bodies (e.g., 
trade associations).  
 
In all of this the national Supreme Court plays what 
sometimes seems a capricious role: generally it accepts those 
consensus decisions, but from time-to-time, at the request 
usually of private parties and rarely of component state 
representatives, it determines that the nationally-agreed upon 
federal rule impermissibly infringes on state authority.  
 
II.  
  
The Federal Distribution and Exercise of Lawmaking Power 
 
The location of lawmaking powers is rightly the first 
question in reporting on uniform laws in federal entities. 
Unification of laws is needed only if lawmaking powers rest 
with more than one entity. If lawmaking powers are reserved 
to the central government, laws are perforce uniform. But if 
states enjoy lawmaking power, uniformity of law is challenged. 
Absent  concerted efforts to make laws uniform, anything like 
uniformity is apt to be the result of accident.3
Americans assume that extensive lawmaking powers are 
essential to every level of a multigovernmental entity. How can 
an entity be federal if its component states do not have 
independent law making authority? How can a locality have 
home rule if it cannot write its own laws? Foreign examples 
challenge this assumption. An entity can properly be seen as 
 
 
                                               
3 Cf., TIMOTHY WALKER, INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN LAW § 144, at p. 149 (1837). 
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federal, even though some, or perhaps all, lawmaking powers 
are concentrated with the central government. Component 
states are no less independent and decentralization is no less 
furthered by different models where lawmaking is a coopera-
tive endeavor of the component states at the central level and 
lawapplying is devolved upon the component states. It is well 
to remember that there is no unitary form of federalism and 
that different forms may use different admixtures of these 
models. 
 
This Part II addresses distribution of lawmaking powers 
in American federalism. The following Part III considers 
approaches used to bring uniformity when those powers are 
exercised in appyling law. Part IV deals with the institutional 
and social background of uniform law. Part V is a unification 
“scorecard,” while  Part VI is a conclusion. 
 
1. The limited legislative jurisdiction of the central authority 
 
a. Federal powers 
 
The Constitution of the United States of America creates 
a federal government of limited powers. Article I, section 8 sets 
out the lawmaking powers of Congress. It is the principal 
source of federal legislative authority. Article VI prescribes that 
where the federal government has legislative power, federal 
law is supreme. Article 1, section 10, proscribes certain conduct 
by the states. The tenth amendment, adopted in 1791, reserves 
powers not delegated to the federal government, to the states.  
 
Article 1, section 8 bestows upon the federal legislature 
(Congress) powers: 1. “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Im-
posts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States; …” (the 
“General Welfare Clause”); 2. to borrow money;  3. “To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes” (the “Commerce Clause”); 4. “To es-
tablish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws 
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on the Subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;” 
5. to coin Money and fix the standard of weights and measures; 
6. To punish counterfeiting; 7. To establish post offices and post 
roads; 8. To secure to authors and inventors the exclusive right 
to their respective writings and discoveries (the “Patent and 
Copyright Clause”); 9. To constitute Tribunals inferior to the 
Supreme Court; 10. To define and punish offences against the 
Law of Nations; 11. To declare war; 12. To raise and support 
Armies; 13. To provide and maintain a Navy; 14. To make rules 
for the same; 15. To call forth the Militia to execute the Laws of 
the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions; 16. To 
make rules for the same; 17. “To exercise exclusive Legislation 
over the Seat of the Government;” and, 18. “To make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof (the “Necessary and Proper 
Clause”). Article II, section 2 bestows upon the President, with 
“the advice and consent of the Senate (i.e., the upper house of 
the legislature), the power to make treaties (the “Foreign Affairs 
Power”). Article III, section 2, provides that national judicial 
power shall extend to “all cases arising under this Constitution, 
the laws of the United States, and treaties made … under their 
authority” as well as certain other controversies involving the 
United States or parties from different states or nations. 
 
While all lawmaking powers are in principle enume-
rated, some are so general that a power is available if the politi-
cal will is present. Often it is. The federal government need not 
wait for states to take action. That it does take action, does not, 
however, as we shall discuss below, oust the states of lawmak-
ing jurisdiction completely. 
 
Education law is an example of how quickly leadership 
can change when political will is present. For a long time any 
federal involvement in education, other than in funding higher 
education, met with substantial resistance. States, often follow-
ing the lead of national accrediting and testing bodies, deter-
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mined the law. But the in the 2000s the central government 
sought to set national standards for local education. 
 
b. Few federal lawmaking powers are exclusive; most 
are concurrent with lawmaking powers of component 
states 
 
Were federal powers all exclusive—as was argued by 
some in the early years of the country4—federal law would be 
uniform and this report could be limited to areas outside feder-
al lawmaking authority. But that view did not prevail. The Su-
preme Court rejected it in 1819 in the case of Sturges v. Crow-
ninshield,5
In those early years the Supreme Court followed the ap-
proach laid out in the Federalist, No. 32, which identifies three 
categories of exclusive federal powers in the Constitution.
 where it held that federal power to create uniform 
laws on the subject of bankruptcy is not exclusive so long as 
Congress is not currently exercising that power. 
 
6
                                               
4 See, e.g., Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 122 (1819) (arguments of 
Daggett and Hopkinson for plaintiff). See also Joseph Story, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 444, p. 428 (1833); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CON-
STITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at 145-150 
(1985). 
5 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 122. 
 The 
first category consists of those powers that the Constitution ex-
pressly designates “exclusive.” The only such power is the 
power over the national seat of government (no. 17 above). In 
the second category are those powers that the Constitution 
grants to the federal government and expressly denies to the 
states (principally in article I, section 10). These include powers 
to enter into treaties, coin money, impose duties on imports or 
exports, maintain armies, and conduct war. The Federalist’s 
third category cannot be linguistically, but only politically de-
fined. It consists of those powers that the Constitution grants 
the federal government, where, according to the Federalist, “a 
6 JOSEPH STORY, CONSTITUTION, supra note 14, § 437, at 422. 
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similar authority in the states would be absolutely and totally 
CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT.”7
Concurrency conflicts with the objective of uniformity of 
law and is a catalyst for uniform lawmaking. For where federal 
legislative jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the states, ab-
sent uniform laws, and perhaps even then, law is anything but 
uniform. As we shall see, in this “interjurisdictional gray area” 
there is a “conflict and confusion.”
 
 
Few federal powers fall into the Federalist’s first and 
second categories; most are in the third. Since the Supreme 
Court has hesitated to find federal powers broadly exclusive, 
most federal lawmaking powers are concurrent with the pow-
ers of the states.  
 
8
Federal regulation is often piecemeal. State law is, in 
theory, organic. Federal law is to supplement state law to deal 
with specific issues that require national treatment. This is just 
the reverse of providing a general federal rule from which 
  
 
c.  The most important federal powers 
 
The most important constitutionally specified sources 
authorizing central government regulation are the General 
Welfare Clause, the Commerce Clause, the Patent and Copy-
right Clause, the various clauses related to national defense, the 
Foreign Affairs Power, and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 
Where potential legislation does not clearly fall under 
one of the powers specifically stated, the most likely basis for 
federal regulation is either the Commerce Clause alone or the 
Commerce Clause in conjunction with the Necessary and Prop-
er Clause.  
 
                                               
7 1 THE FEDERALIST: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS WRITTEN IN FAVOUR OF THE NEW CONSTI-
TUTION No. 32 (1788) [emphasis in original]. 
8 So called by Erin Ryan in Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and 
Balance in the Intrjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503 (2007). 
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component states are permitted to deviate. It means that feder-
al regulation is often neither comprehensive nor systematic.9
The Commerce Clause by its terms authorizes the 
federal government “To regulate commerce … among the 
several States.” Some people at the time of its adoption thought 
that this was a power to regulate commerce generally among 
the states.
  
 
10 Instead, the Supreme Court viewed the power 
more narrowly. It sought to distinguish commerce that it saw 
as properly concerning the federal government and commerce 
that concerned only the component states. The task of drawing 
clear lines proved impossible to achieve. In the very case where 
the Supreme Court first attempted to measure state statutes 
against federal legislative power, Gibbons v. Ogden, Justice 
Johnson presciently warned that the competing powers “meet 
and blend so as scarcely to admit of separation.”11
In deciding this question, the Supreme Court has little 
political legitimacy on which to rely, since it is not elected. 
Faced with demands for federal action in response to the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the Court largely ceded this issue as a 
political decision to Congress. Only more recently, in the boom 
economic times of the 1990s, did the court—to general 
consternation—revisit the issue and invalidate a federal law 
 
In nearly two centuries of interpreting the Commerce 
Clause the Supreme Court has vacillated from expounding it 
expansively to reading it restrictively. The Court has prescribed 
one test or another to judge whether a particular exercise of 
federal authority is proper (e.g., “channels or instrumentalities 
of commerce,” “in commerce,” “affecting commerce”).  
                                               
9 The approach is reminiscent of how common law courts construe statutes in dero-
gation of the common law. 
10 See., e.g., JAMES SULLIVAN, THE HISTORY OF LAND TITLES IN MASSACHUSETTS 352-355 
(1801); see generally WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (3 vols., 1953, 1980). 
11 6 U.S. (9 Wheaton) 1, 32 (1824). The Court did not accept the argument that 
whenever Congress “declines to establish a law, it is to be considered a declaration 
that it is unfit that such a law should exist.” 
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based on the Commerce Clause.12
 Employment and labor law. Although the federal involve-
ment is high, states still set the basic tenor. In practice, most 
states adhere to an employment-at-will doctrine which permits 
employers (and employees) largely unlimited freedom to sever 
the employment relationship. Federal law overlays this state 
law with many particular regulations governing such disparate 
topics as discrimination among employees based on personal 
 The law in question 
prohibited carrying firearms in schools; it regulated “non-
economic activity” and therefore, in this Court’s view, fell 
outside the legislative authority of the federal government. The 
result of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
is to complicate federal legislation and to inhibit, but not 
prohibit, broader national solutions to problems. 
d.  Important practice areas of federal regulation 
 In American legal practice, a common expression is 
“don’t make a federal case out of it.” While coined with litiga-
tion in mind, it speaks to the division in legal practice of federal 
and state matters. Commercially and politically important mat-
ters are largely issues of federal law; day-to-day mundane mat-
ters are typically issues of state law. Large law firms deal with 
the former; solo practitioners handle the latter. So matters of 
traditional private law, e.g., contracts, family law, inheritance, 
real property, are largely state law. Major commercial matters, 
other than corporate organization itself, are usually federal law.  
 
Some areas in which federal law has a strong or domi-
nant role include:  
 
 Competition law. It consists of antitrust, unfair competi-
tion and trademark law. Although it is principally federal law, 
yet there are significant state and even municipal laws that also 
regulate the field. Moreover, local authorities not infrequently 
enforce federal laws. 
 
                                               
12 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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characteristics (such as age, gender, national origin, race and 
religion), sexual harassment, equal pay, and labor unions. 
 
 Environmental law. Basic property law, including land-
use planning, is quintessentially state law. Yet there is an over-
lay of all manner of federal law from A for Asbestos School 
Hazard Detection and Control, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., to T for 
Toxic Substance Control, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601 et seq. 
 
Securities law. The laws under which business organiza-
tions are formed are state laws, but the principal laws under 
which large public corporations are regulated and pursuant to 
which obligations to shareholders are determined, are federal. 
 
Tax law is based on authority other than the Commerce 
Clause, namely on the General Welfare Clause. While the com-
ponent states have extensive taxes of their own, excepting taxes 
on real estate and on turnover, federal tax law is the most im-
portant and largely sets the rules de facto by which state taxes 
are assessed.  
 
2. The organic legislative jurisdiction of the component states  
 
 a. State powers 
 
 The component states are the organic sources of gov-
ernment authority in the United States. Each state has its own 
constitution from which authority to legislate arises. The feder-
al Constitution assumes the existence of the component states. 
The federal government can not abolish the states or funda-
mentally alter the nation’s composition. Article IV, section 3, 
while allowing Congress to admit new states, provides that “no 
new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of 
any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two 
or more States, or parts of States, without the Consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.” 
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The Constitution, with a minor exception relating to 
state militia, contains no explicit grant of exclusive legislative 
jurisdiction to the component states; its tenth amendment, 
however, reserves powers not delegated to the central govern-
ment, to the component states.  
 
 Since the federal government is a government of limited 
authority, and the states maintain the organic law-giving com-
petence, to this day state law dominates core areas of public 
and private law, including most criminal and civil law. The lat-
ter includes contracts, family, inheritance, property, tort and 
corporate law. States determine the organization of, and the 
procedures used by, their courts. 
 
Areas where state law is dominant, but shares authority 
with federal law include consumer protection, criminal law, 
education law, gambling law and traffic and driving law.  
 
3. Conflicts and coordination of state and federal law 
 
a. Supremacy of federal law 
 
Article VI, section 2 provides that federal law is supreme 
(the “Supremacy Clause”)13
The Supreme Court has given federal law a greater 
priority than the Supremacy Clause strictly requires. It has not 
limited the Supremacy Clause to being a mere choice-of-law 
rule that determines which law applies in the case of a con-
flict.
. The lowest of federal laws is supe-
rior to conflicting provisions of state laws, including state con-
stitutions.  
 
14
                                               
13 “This Constitution and the Law of the United States which shall be made in Pur-
suance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority 
of the United States; shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to 
the Contrary notwithstanding.” 
 Instead, it has held that in certain situations, federal leg-
14 Cf. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
441, p. 425 (“Are the state laws inoperative only to the extent of the actual conflict; or 
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islation preempts state legislation entirely. This happens most 
easily, when a federal statute states that it preempts state law. 
In such cases, a court has only to determine whether state law 
is inconsistent with federal law. But federal law may also im-
plicitly preempt state law if it “stands as an obstacle to accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”15 The Supreme Court may find this to be the case 
when there is “conflict preemption” or there is “field preemp-
tion.” The former is the case where state law contravenes fed-
eral purposes or requires action that conflicts with federal law. 
The latter occurs when federal regulation of a particular field is 
“so dominant” that state laws on the same subject should not 
operate.16
Non-exercise of federal powers in the early years of the 
country made it more difficult to determine when a power 
should be exclusive. For some things, the country could not 
wait. For example, for more than fifty years after the constitu-
tional convention, Congress did nothing about setting national 
standards for weights and measures. So the “common under-
standing was, that until Congress should fix a general standard 
for the states, each state was “at liberty to fix one for itself.”
 
 
State governments, and even municipal governments, in 
areas of concurrent state/federal legislative competency, some-
times adopt legislation that is inconsistent with federal legisla-
tion. This legislation is presumptively valid until such time as a 
court, acting in a concrete case or controversy, determines that 
the state legislation is invalid as preempted by federal legisla-
tion or by a grant of federal legislative authority.  
 
b. Non-exercise of federal powers and state law 
 
17
                                                                                                              
does the legislation of congress supersede the state legislation, or suspend the legis-
lative power of the states over the subject matter?”). 
15 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).  
16 See English v. General Electric Company, 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990). 
  
 
17 WALKER, supra note 3. 
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The difficulty non-exercise made for interpretation is 
well illustrated by the Supreme Court’s contrasting treatment 
of the two powers the Constitution grants in clause 4 of article 
I, section 8: “4. To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, 
and uniform Laws on the Subject of Bankruptcies throughout 
the United States.” Although the Constitution uses virtually the 
same language for both powers and combines them in the same 
clause, the Court held the former exclusive18 and the latter con-
current.19
In the case of the Naturalization Power, the Court fol-
lowed the argument of the Federalist: the Naturalization Power 
falls within the third category “because if each state had power 
to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could be no UNIFORM 
RULE.”
  
 
20 Of course, the same argument seems to be true equally 
of the Bankruptcy Power, which the Federalist did not address. 
But the Court held otherwise. The principal difference between 
the two cases is that Congress had always exercised the Natu-
ralization Power while it had only intermittently exercised the 
Bankruptcy Power.21
 The Supreme Court does not, however, allow state legis-
lation in every instance of unexercised federal power. For ex-
ample, in the case of state regulation of commerce, it applies 
the doctrine of the “dormant Commerce Clause.” Under this 
doctrine it may invalidate state or local laws that “discriminate 
against”
   
 
22 or impose an “undue burden”23
Unlike more modern federal constitutions, the American 
Constitution of 1789 does not address directly how state and 
 on “interstate com-
merce.” 
 
c. Coordination of state and federal law 
 
                                               
18 Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheaton) 259 (1817). 
19 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 122 (1819). 
20 1 THE FEDERALIST: supra note 7  [emphasis in original]. 
21 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17. U.S. (4 Wheaton) 122 (1819) 
22 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978). 
23 Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951). 
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federal governments should coordinate their laws. It does not 
well demark areas where federal legislative jurisdiction is ex-
clusive and where it is shared with the states. It does not define 
what exclusive and what concurrent might mean. But it does 
allow a  high level of concurrency in lawmaking. 
 
The combination of these two factors—lack of constitu-
tional coordination and a high incidence of concurrent jurisdic-
tion—contributes mightily to non-uniformity and uncertainty. 
It creates a certain competition between state and federal law. 
 
 Competition between state and federal law need not 
lead to substantial legal uncertainty, if conflicts between state 
and federal authority are determined before laws take effect. 24
A particular weakness of American federalism is that 
questions of legislative competency are often decided not befo-
rehand, but only as a legal rule is applied, and therefore at the 
risk and expense of those trying to comply with the law, whi-
chever one it may be that is applicable.  The issue of legislative 
competency may even be an element of a party’s case. For ex-
ample, to apply a federal law may require proof that this par-
ticular instance of application has a specific connection to “in-
terstate commerce,” such as an “effect” on “interstate com-
merce”
 
For this, coordination prior to litigation is essential. It is not 
enough to say that one government level has authority to legis-
late, and to the extent that it does, its law governs and super-
sedes competing laws.  
 
25 or use of an “instrumentality of interstate commerce, 
or of the mails.”26
                                               
24 See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to American Legal 
Indeterminacy?, 15 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 596 (2007) (discussing German fede-
ralism). 
25 For example, the antitrust laws. See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 
322 (1991). 
26 For example, the securities laws. See, e.g., Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR 240.10b-5. 
 Conversely, to apply state law may require a 
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showing that this specific application does not infringe on a 
possibly not yet adopted federal law.27
There is a point of view that such case-by-case review is 
work worth doing notwithstanding the obvious greater effi-
ciency of an ex ante, generalized decision. Some see that “the 
challenge faced by the new commercial federalism [to] be in 
establishing and policing the limits on federal power.”
  
 
28 This 
approach would “enable redress whenever a plaintiff with standing 
shows that regulatory activity in the gray area unduly threatens Our 
Federalism [with tyranny].”29
                                               
27 Some American law professors now see this “competitive federalism,” i.e., non-
uniformity of law, as a good thing! See, e.g., Bruce Johnson & Moin A. Yahya , The 
Evolution of Sherman Act Jurisdiction: A Roadmap for Competitive Federalism, 7 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 403 (2004). 
28 See A Brooke Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297, 356 
(2003). 
29 Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and Balance in the 
Intrjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 648 (2007).  
  
 
5. Municipalities 
 
The Constitution makes no provision for municipalities. 
As a matter of state law, municipalities have only such 
authority as the states grant them. Originally, the states strictly 
limited municipal authority. Beginning in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century, however, states began extending to 
municipalities “home rule.” Often, in addition to authority to 
administer their own affairs, states granted municipalities 
authority to legislate. Today municipalities are seen as the 
intrastate analogue of federalism. Most states apply a rule that 
all powers are granted until retracted. This includes authority 
to issue laws as significant as creating criminal offenses, 
imposing requirements on employment, prohibiting trade 
practices and controlling construction through zoning laws. 
There are approximately 40,000 sub-state government entities 
in the United States. 
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III.   
  
The Means and Methods of Legal Unification 
 
The means and methods of legal unification are the same 
as the means and methods of lawmaking and law applying in 
general. Thus unification takes place, or does not take place, 
within the context of existing approaches to legal methods. In 
this regard, the United States operates within its own peculiar 
version of the common law.  
 
The common law heritage is both blessing and bane for 
American legal unification. It is a blessing, because it brings a 
strong central court and a tradition of consistent case law. But it 
is a bane, because conditions in the United States are different 
than they were in 18th century England, when American com-
mon law methods developed in England. American courts are 
less centralized than were their 18th century English counter-
parts; the limitations of a law of precedents are much greater in 
a modern economy of 300 million people than they were in a 
pre-industrial economy of fewer than 10 million people.30
                                               
30 According to the first British census, in 1801 the population of England was 8,331,434. 
ABSTRACT OF THE ANSWERS AND RETURNS, MADE PURSUANT TO THE ACT, PASSED IN THE FOR-
TY-FIRST YEAR OF HIS MAJESTY KING GEORGE III, INTITULED, ‘AN ACT FOR TAKING AN AC-
COUNT OF THE POPULATION OF GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE INCREASE OR DIMUTION THEREOF, 
ENUMERATION 4 (1802), available at Online Historical Population Reports, 
 
  
In its Supreme Court the United States shares the com-
mon law benefit of a strong court at the seat of national gov-
ernment. Insofar as the Supreme Court is competent—both le-
gally and practically—its pronouncements in Washington can 
have much the same salutary effect for legal unification as 
those of its counterparts in Westminster had in the 18th and 19th 
centuries.  
 
http://www.histpop.org/ohpr/servlet/PageBrowser?path=Browse/Census%20(by%20date)&active
=yes&mno=2&tocstate=expandnew&tocseq=100&display=sections&display=tables&display=pa
getitles&pageseq=first-nonblank.  
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As we have seen, however, for most of American law, 
the Supreme Court is not legally competent. It therefore often is 
not able to contribute substantially to unification of law. In 
most areas of law, the Supreme Court of the United States is 
not the highest court, instead the highest courts of the states 
have the last word. There are fifty such courts. There are no 
formal and only limited informal means for coordinating the 
decisions of those fifty supreme courts. 
 
Moreover, the precedents of the Supreme Court share 
the deficiencies of case law generally. Precedents decide single 
cases; they find a rule applicable to one case. They are not de-
signed to decide abstractly and consistently a generality of cas-
es. More precedents in theory clarify the law, but they also 
muddy it by increasing exponentially the number of “authori-
tative” texts. Most American precedents these days descend 
from the federal appellate courts or the state courts, and are not 
decisions of the Supreme Court. They have binding effect only 
on subordinate courts and do not bind coordinate courts or 
their respective subordinate courts. Only the Supreme Court 
can bind all courts and then only in matters of federal law. But 
it renders full opinions in only about 80 cases a year. 
 
While in 1837, the common law provided most Ameri-
can law, by 1937, if not sooner, statute law had displaced com-
mon law as the principal source of American law. Yet the Unit-
ed States has difficulty adopting and implementing statutes. 
The American legal system has yet to develop efficient and ef-
fective methods of legislation.31 The United States, says Judge 
Richard A. Posner, has no “overall theory of legislation.”32
                                               
31 See James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy Made in America: U.S. Legal Methods and 
the Rule of Law, 41 VALPARAISO U. L. REV. 517, 528 (2006).  
32 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 
U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 800 (1983). 
 An 
overall theory of legislation requires methods of drafting and 
methods of statutory interpretation. While the American legal 
system has methods of statutory interpretation, these are, ac-
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cording to Justice Antonin Scalia, unintelligible.33 It has no me-
thod of legislative drafting, which it has long neglected.34 Indi-
vidual Congressmen, not government ministries, are responsi-
ble for drafting legislation. Coalitions of Congressmen must 
negotiate with each other and strike deals with the President to 
get laws adopted. The consequences for legal unification are 
substantial and negative: new legislation is difficult to adopt 
and;35
The Bill of Rights (the first ten amendments), adopted in 
1791, also did not create norms directly applicable to the states; 
it applied only to the federal government.
 its technical quality is apt to be poor. 
 
  
1. Legal unification and harmonization by exercise of central 
power  
 
a. Through constitutional norms 
 
The Constitution as adopted in 1789 had few norms di-
rectly applicable to component states. Most of these concern 
establishing state recognition of the laws and legal acts of other 
states and of the federal government or prohibiting certain state 
conduct (e.g., imposing customs duties, making treaties with 
foreign countries). Among those few designed to create uni-
form norms, perhaps the most important and surely the most 
controversial, was article IV, section 3, the nefarious “Fugitive 
Slave Clause.” It requires (requires, for it has never been re-
pealed), that persons “held to service or labor in one State un-
der the laws therefore, escaping into another,” shall not be 
freed, “but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom 
such service or labor may be due.”   
 
36
                                               
33 Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 That changed, 
however, following the adoption of the fourteenth amendment 
34 Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 33, at 96. 
35 See Donald J. Smythe, Commercial Law in the Cracks of Judicial Federalism, 56 CATHO-
LIC U. L. REV. 451, 459-461 (2007). 
36 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 32 (1833). 
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in 1868. While the amendment did not itself apply the Bill of 
Rights to the states, the Supreme Court has interpreted its Due 
Process Clause, which does apply to the States, to incorporate 
the most important protections of the Bill of Rights.  
 
The Supreme Court can and does—albeit infrequently—
use the protections of the Bill of Rights to create uniform law 
throughout the land. The advantage of this approach is that 
one Supreme Court decision instantly brings legal unification. 
For example, on January 21, 1973, abortion was legal in some 
states and illegal in others. On January 22, 1973, when the Su-
preme Court decided the case of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973), it became legal in all states.  
 
Necessarily only the Supreme Court can create such na-
tional unity. Since its authority extends only to deciding specif-
ic cases, it can not promulgate comprehensive legislative-like 
solutions to problems. As a consequence the Court is better 
able to harmonize law than it is to unify law. What the Court 
does best is prohibit contradictory legislation. Less well can it 
prescribe positive legislation, although it does occasionally pre-
scribe specific rules. Where the Court does prescribe such na-
tional norms, typically these norms overwhelm any state rules. 
Most commonly they are procedural. Typically they take their 
names from the cases that promulgated them. Here are several 
examples:  
 
“Brady materials”37
                                               
37 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). See California Commission on the Fair Ad-
ministration of Justice, Report and Recommendations on Compliance with the Pro-
secutorial Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, available at 
. In criminal procedure prosecutors 
must disclose certain information that may exculpate defen-
dants or may impeach the testimony of witnesses against the 
defendant  (e.g., deals in exchange for testimony). 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/prosecutorial/official/OFFICIAL%20RE
PORT%20ON%20BRADY%20COMPLIANCE.pdf  (March 6, 2008) (noting at 2 that 
“The prosecutor’s Brady duty to disclose exculpatory evidence under the due process 
clause of the United States constitution is wholly independent of any statutory 
scheme. It is self-executing and needs no statutory support to be effective.”)  
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“Miranda warnings.”38 In criminal investigations, before 
questioning a suspect, the police must inform the suspect of his 
or her fifth amendment right not to make self-incriminating 
statements. In the decision itself the Court prescribed specific 
language.39
 While this approach has the virtue of immediate appli-
cability, it has serious drawbacks. Constitutionalizing an issue 
largely eliminates legislative solutions. Legislative solutions 
can be political compromises. They can change as political 
temperaments change. They can draw bright lines that are easy 
to apply, even if they are not always easy to justify. Constitu-
tional solutions are, by the nature of American constitutional 
decision-making (see below), judge-made solutions normally 
devoid of bright lines. They invite litigation to change them or 
just to determine what they mean, for there is no other way to 
obtain an authoritative interpretation.
 
 
40
In a few areas of law, i.e., where the Constitution gives 
Congress a clear grant of power, or where the courts hold that 
grant to be exclusive, federal legislation brings uniform law.  
These areas include naturalization, patents and copyrights.
 
 
b. Through directly applicable central legislation (or ex-
ecutive or administrative rules) 
 
41
                                               
38 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)  
39 Id. (“You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used 
against you in a court of law. You have the right to speak to an attorney, and to have 
an attorney present during any questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will 
be provided for you at government expense.”) 
40 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 45 (1987) 
(“But if the courts unnecessarily decide such controversies on constitutional 
grounds, these potentially creative and collaborative processes are brought to a 
halt.”) 
41 To promote uniform interpretation and application of patent and copyright law, in 
1982 Congress created a new appellate court to decide all such appeals. It is an un-
usual creature in a system that prefers generalist to specialist courts. 
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In those areas where Congress shares legislative authori-
ty with the states, it has been hesitant to oust states of concur-
rent jurisdiction and timid even in asserting its own. The work-
ing assumption is that the federal role should be limited unless 
there is a compelling reason to assert federal leadership exists.42
For example, many have long looked to Congress for a 
national commercial law; for more than two centuries, all who 
have done so, have been disappointed. Already in 1801, James 
Sullivan, then attorney general and later governor of Massa-
chusetts, urged that “[t]here ought to be one uniform rule 
throughout the nation, on bills of exchange, promissory notes, 
policies, and all personal contracts [for these] all arise from 
commerce, and the regulation of them is the regulation of 
commerce itself.”
 
 
Congress has usually resisted requests that it occupy 
systematically a distinct field of law to the exclusion of the 
states. Indeed, unless one defines distinct field narrowly, it may 
never have done so. 
 
43 Other equally distinguished jurists and 
well-placed advocates made similar proposals in the 1880s and 
again in the 1920s and 1930s. Their calls induced not national 
commercial law, but did contribute to efforts to find state alter-
natives to a national law. They were catalysts for creation of the 
National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform States Laws 
in 1892 and for the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code 
in the 1940s and 1950s.44
Congress, when it does act, often does not cover a whole 
field, but only sections of it, or even only specific problems 
within a section. An example is data protection, which is also 
known as privacy law. The United States was among the first 
countries to adopt a data protection law, but applied it only to 
 
 
                                               
42 See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Contextual Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVI-
RONMENTAL L.J. 108, 110 (2005). 
43 SULLIVAN, supra note 10, at 353. 
44 See E. Hunter Taylor, Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS-
CAMDEN L.J. 527, 529-530 (1980). 
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consumer credit reports.45 Since then many countries have 
adopted data protection laws; most have adopted what are re-
ferred to as “omnibus” laws that apply to personal data gener-
ally. The United States, even as it slowly followed the lead of 
other countries in expanding data protection, stayed true to 
what is called a “sectoral” approach. The sectoral approach 
made the United States something of a laughing-stock in inter-
national discourse in the 1990s, when the United States pro-
tected video tape rental and sale records46 long before it pro-
tected financial47 and health records.48
The federal government cannot compel states to adopt 
legislation. Such measures are considered an infringement of 
the sovereign prerogatives of the component states.
    
 
The protection of health records is an example of Con-
gress delegating authority to create uniform rules through ad-
ministrative rule rather than federal statute.   
 
 Federal direct legislation is thus paradoxical: federal law 
can be found in nearly every aspect of life, yet there are surpri-
singly few areas of practice based exclusively on federal law.  
 
c. Through central legislation inducing state legislation 
 
49
While Congress hesitates to preempt state lawmaking 
power, it practically rushes to use federal legislation to induce 
states to adopt laws that coordinate with federal policies and 
 Thus the 
United States is not able to adapt the directive approach of the 
European Union or the framework laws approach of Germany. 
 
                                               
45 Fair Credit Reporting Act, adopted in 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. 
46 Video Privacy Protection Act, adopted in 1988, 18 U.S.C. § 2710. The Act does not 
cover DVDs, since they had yet to be commercialized.  
47 Gramm-Leach-Blilely Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, adopted in 
1999, 15 U.S.C. § 6801, et seq. 
48 The Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (“Privacy 
Rule”), 45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Part 164, implementing the require-
ments of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HI-
PAA”), Public Law 104-191. 
49 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).  
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thereby harmonize with one another. Congress uses approach-
es far too numerous to detail here. Most go under the name of 
“cooperative federalism.” That the result is cacophony rather 
than harmony is not an unusual judgment.50
 A mundane example suggests the problematic nature of 
such cooperation. The Consumer Patient Radiation Health and 
Safety Act of 1981
  
 
 
51 directed the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to develop minimum standards for state certification 
and licensure of personnel who administer ionizing or nonio-
nizing radiation in medical and dental radiologic procedures. 
The Act does not require adoption of the standards and does 
not sanction non-adoption. Only 35 states developed standards. 
According to the professional organization behind such licens-
ing, these standards “vary dramatically” from state-to-state. 
The remaining 15 states, the professional organization reports, 
essentially have no standards (requiring two weeks, not two 
years of training). 52
 It is sometimes suggested that the threat of federal legis-
lation leads to states adopting legislation as a lesser evil. This 
 
 
 This lack of success of the law illustrates the limits of the 
cooperative federalism approach.  Without compulsion, either 
binding law or a practically equivalent fiscal measure, not all 
states go along; those that do, do not do so uniformly. The re-
sult, at best, is harmonized law; it is not uniform law. 
 
                                               
50 See, e.g., Jonathan Adler, Jurisdiction Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 14 
N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL L.J. 130 (2005) (“The division of authority and responsibility 
for environmental protection between the federal and state governments lacks any 
cohesive rationale or justification.”). See also Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federal-
ism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL L.J. 179 (2005); A. Brooke 
Overby, Our New Commercial Law Federalism, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 297 (2003). 
51 42 U.S.C. §§ 10001-10008. 
52 American Society of Radiologic Technologists, Background Information on State 
and Federal Licensure Issues, 
https://www.asrt.org/content/GovernmentRelations/LegislativeGuidebook/Licen
sureBackgroundInfo.aspx 
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seems to have been an explanation for the creation of the Uni-
form Commercial Code. But in most instances, where legisla-
tion does not go through the NCCUSL process, if there is such 
a reaction, i.e., if it leads to legislation, that legislation is likely 
to be disparate and not uniform, and is likely to be adopted by 
some, but not by all states.   
  
This approach is less likely to come out of the central 
government than from local constituencies. What is more likely 
to happen is that one constituency, with greater or lesser access 
to legislative influence, suggests a need for a national rule. It, or 
other constituencies then seek state legislation as an alternative 
to federal legislation. 
 
 
d. Through information exchanges among the component 
states  
 
Information exchanges among component states are an 
important source of coordination, but these are rarely managed 
by the central government. More commonly, national organiza-
tions, e.g., the National Association of Attorneys General, the 
National Center for State Courts, or national trade associations, 
do the managing. 
 
 
2. Legal unification through formal or informal voluntary 
coordination among component states  
 
a. By component state legislatures imitating others  
 
Imitation, which is a form of informal coordination, is 
one of the most important methods for attaining harmoniza-
tion, if not unification, in American law. Uniform and model 
laws promote this imitation, but do not exhaust it. Success with 
formal uniform laws voluntarily adopted has been limited. See 
3.a. and 3.b. below.  
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b. By component state judiciaries, e.g., through state 
court consideration of practice of sister states  
 
This is essentially the restatement approach, considered 
below, but without the validation of the precedents reviewed 
by the American Law Institute. Little can be expected of this 
approach. It cannot possibly be systematic or comprehensive, 
nor can it be uniform or universal. Owing to the vagaries of lit-
igation, a court can consider only issues that arise in a specific 
case. Owing to limitations of case law, a court can decide only 
issues on the facts of this case. Owing to the proliferation of 
precedents, a court can hardly review all those precedents that 
might possibly come into play. No longer is it reasonable to ex-
pect a judge—especially a trial judge—to review decisions 
around the country.53
 Two non-state actors play a prominent role in promoting 
legal unification: the National Conference of Commissioners of 
Uniform State Law (“NCCUSL”) and the American Law Insti-
tute (“ALI”). The two bodies differ in their basic approach, but 
 Owing to the irregularity of litigation, it 
should not be expected that the same issue would even come 
before the highest courts of all fifty states, not to mention be 
decided in the same way.  
 
 
c. By agreements among component states 
 
Component states in the United States may agree with 
each other to legislation or administrative rules. Article I, sec-
tion 10, clause 3 of the Constitution requires that the federal 
government approve such “interstate compacts.” While use of 
interstate compacts has become more common in recent years, 
the focus of most compacts is not on creating uniform law. Typ-
ically interstate compacts are regional and are concerned with 
matters of administration rather than of legislation. 
 
3.  Legal unification promoted by non-state actors 
 
                                               
53 See Maxeiner, Legal Indeterminacy, supra note 31, at 543. 
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both depend on voluntary adoption of their products. Besides 
these two law reform organizations, a host of other private or-
ganizations ranging from associations of government officials 
to university think tanks offer model laws to the nation’s legis-
latures for possible adoption.54
The optimism of NCCUSL’s founders was palpable; its 
first report asserted: “It is probably not too much to say that 
this is the most important juristic work undertaken in the Unit-
ed States since the adoption of the Federal [C]onstitution.”
 
 
 a. Uniform laws and NCCUSL 
 
 The National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform 
State Law was founded in 1892 by the states themselves. The 
states are represented in NCCUSL as state delegations. 
NCCUSL drafts and proposes uniform laws for state legisla-
tures to adopt. The ideal goal is that all states will adopt all uni-
form laws without changes. NCCUSL began work with com-
mercial and divorce law. 
 
55 
While uniform laws have had some success, it has not matched 
these hopes. While it had fair success with commercial law in 
its first years, it flopped with divorce law. In the first century of 
its existence, NCCUSL proposed approximately 200 uniform 
acts. Only about ten percent of these acts were adopted by as 
many as forty states; more than half were adopted by fewer 
than ten states. 56
                                               
54 See, e.g., United States Ombudsman Association, Model Ombudsman Act for State 
Governments (1997), available at 
  
 
http://www.usombudsman.org/documents/PDF/References/USOA_MODEL_AC
T.pdf; Centers for Law and the Public's Health: A Collaborative at Johns Hopkins 
and Georgetown Universities, The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act 
(2001), available at http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/Modellaws.htm.  
55 See Leonard A. Jones, Uniformity of Laws Through National and Interstate Codification, 
in REPORT OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 157, 
169 (1894), reprinted in 28 AM. L. REV. 547 (1894).  
56 James J. White, One Hundred Years of Uniform State Laws: Ex Proprio Vigore, 89 
MICH. L. REV. 2096, 2103-05 (1991). 
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Uniform laws encounter a host of problems some of 
which are inherent in the task and some of which are peculiar 
to the American form. These problems range from the political 
to the technical. They include: 
 
(i) A perception that they lack drafting legitimacy. Legisla-
tion is normally subject to political compromise. But there is no 
democratic representation in the drafting of uniform laws. 
While drafting sessions are open to the public, not surprisingly, 
the industries most immediately concerned are best 
represented. There is a perception in many members of the bar 
and public that the uniform laws projects are “captured” by 
those industries. (E.g., Article 9, bankers; UCITA/proposed Ar-
ticle 2B, software).  
 
(ii) A perception that they are supportive of status quo. This 
perception is often reality. Uniform laws are sold to state legis-
lature as mere technical matters that rationalize existing law 
and acknowledge industry practices. They should not launch 
off in the direction of law reform. Even the perception that they 
are new can lead to defeat. Many of the provisions attacked in 
UCITA/proposed Article 2B were challenged by consumer 
groups even though they did not go beyond existing law. Al-
ready approved amendments to Article 2 were cut back to 
garner support. 
 
(iii.) Non-universal adoption. If uniform laws are to pro-
vide legal unification, all fifty states should adopt them. There 
is no political base that can help bring that about; the sponsor-
ing organization must rely principally on good will. It is thus 
no wonder that so few uniform laws have been adopted un-
iversally. 
 
(iv.) Non-uniform adoptions. As laws of the individual 
states, the adopting states may vary the uniform laws as they 
see fit. Many do. Indeed, some of the uniform laws (e.g., Article 
2 of the U.C.C.) even offer legislatures alternative provisions. 
Insofar as there are interest groups that care about those laws, 
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those groups get fifty chances to get changes made in the law 
that they could not get made at the drafting stage. 
 
(v.) Non-uniform interpretation. No statute is perfect nor 
can any statute anticipate all issues that are likely to arise under 
it. Judicial interpretation has a critical role in keeping uniform 
law current. Yet, since uniform laws are by definition laws of 
the several states, there is no court that can authoritatively in-
terpret them. Until there is such a court—as was proposed as 
long ago as 1917—no uniform law that has been the subject of 
judicial interpretation is likely to be uniform.57
                                               
57 See Herbert Pope, The Federal Courts and a Uniform Law, 28 YALE L. J. 647, 651 (1919) 
(proposing entrusting federal courts of appeal with the task of reviewing uniform 
legislation with a newly established federal court to review their decisions) 
 
 
 
(vi.) Not amendable. Recent experiences with the Uniform 
Commercial Code call into question whether uniform laws can 
be effectively amended. While the drafting process was con-
cluded in less than ten years, the adoption process in the fol-
lowing eight has few successes to claim.  
 
(b) Restatements and the American Law Institute 
 
 The American Law Institute was founded in 1923 by 
practicing jurists and academics. Its membership consists of in-
dividual jurists and is self-selecting. Its initial project was the 
creation of a “Restatement” of American law. As originally 
conceptualized, the Restatement was to define scientifically le-
gal terminology and through the intellectual strength of its sys-
tem, to be relied upon by courts in deciding lawsuits. What was 
originally to be a single restatement turned into restatements of 
particular areas of the law. Most commonly these are areas 
where state law dominates. The American Law Institute 
branched out from restatement to develop “model laws” and to 
join the NCCUSL in the Uniform Commercial Code. Model 
laws differ from uniform laws in that there is no expectation 
that a model law will be adopted by all states verbatim. 
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Restatements have as their audience principally the judi-
ciary. They are not adopted by legislatures as a whole but by 
judges piecemeal. While they help to systematize legal analysis, 
they have not brought about unification. They do promote 
harmonization and often (but not always) ward off worst cases 
of conflicting rules. 
 
The founders of the American Law Institute were no less 
optimistic about their work than were the foundeers of 
NCCUSL about theirs. The ALI founders compared their task 
to that faced by the lawyers of Justinian’s day who “produced 
the codification and exposition of that law which has been the 
main foundation of all the law of the civilized world except the 
law of the English speaking people.”58
                                               
58 REPORT OF THE FORTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 90 
(1923); William Draper Lewis, The American Law Institute, 25 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT’L L. 
25, 28 (1943). 
   
 
 
Top down or coordinate involvement in (a) restate-
ments, (b) uniform law and (c) private standard setting appears 
both to be possible and yet rare. Its rarity is fairly easily ac-
counted for. On the one hand, the federal and state authorities 
do not have the political interest required for continued in-
volvement. On the other hand, the level of continued involve-
ment required is great. Yet the effect of that involvement is un-
certain and indirect. Restatements, uniform laws and private 
standards do not have the force of law by themselves, but re-
quire action by other players to attain that status. Constituen-
cies with particular interests are more likely to be able to rouse 
themselves to participate in such activities. In such cases pro-
posed legislation can become identified with those constituen-
cies and then fail of adoption (e.g., Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act). 
 
4. The role of legal education and training in unification of law  
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Legal education has been a major force for harmoniza-
tion, if not unification of law, through law schools, their profes-
sors and bar examinations. Legal training has not been a force 
for harmonization, but neither has it been a force promoting 
non-uniformity of law, because it no longer exists. While ap-
prentice training was one the exclusive path to the bar, it large-
ly disappeared in the course of the 19th century. The United 
States is alone among the world’s major legal systems in not 
having a system of formal practical training corresponding to 
“articling” in other Common Law countries, similar apprentic-
ing in other civil law countries or to government training 
known in Germany and Japan. 
  
a. Law schools 
 
Law school began as supplement for law office training 
and, in the course of the 19th century, became their substitute. 
Before the Civil War (1861-1865) there were few law schools. 
All were private and some were independent of institutions of 
higher learning. From their earliest days, law schools, for finan-
cial self-preservation, sought students from outside their im-
mediate states of location. Law students, having few schools to 
choose from, attended schools outside their home states.  
 
Today, nearly all American law schools draw significant 
numbers of students from states outside their states of location. 
Not all law schools, however, draw from throughout the feder-
al system to the same extent. Some do so nationally, some re-
gionally and some locally. Over the last century all have tended 
to expand the areas from which they draw. To similar extents, 
graduates of these law schools practice outside the states of 
their law schools’ locations. 
 
 Today, and for a very long time, most American law 
schools have not focused on teaching the law of their states of 
location. They concentrate on federal law in areas where feder-
al law predominates, such as bankruptcy, constitutional law, 
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intellectual property, antitrust, securities regulation and taxa-
tion, as well as in other areas where federal law serves as mod-
el law, such as civil and criminal justice and administrative 
law. In areas where state law predominates, such as contracts, 
property, torts, family law and inheritance law, they concen-
trate not on the law of specific component states but on a hypo-
thetical law of an amalgam of all states. 
 
 American legal methods tend to support this homoge-
nizing approach. American law schools stress the skill of ar-
guing specific points in issue rather than skills of interpreting 
and applying systematic statutes to facts. Since argument take 
priority, skill at identifying the precedents needed to make the 
argument are more important than systematic understanding 
of a specific body of law.  
 
American law schools have a positive effect for harmo-
nization of law. That effect is widely recognized. When they 
teach state law, they teach an homogenized law the basics of 
which applies equally well in all states. When they teach feder-
al law, they teach a presumptively superior law on which states 
ought to model their laws. 
 
Oddly, American law schools do not have such a posi-
tive effect on unification of law. Indeed, they may have a nega-
tive effect. This effect is scarcely noticed.  
 
Uniform law by its nature cannot be case law—at least, 
not where there is a multitude of case-law making courts. It 
must be statutory law; that is, it must consist of, ideally, a sin-
gle authoritative text. But law schools generally give statutes 
short shrift. The issue-focused nature of American litigation 
tends to prefer study of case law based solutions. For example, 
to this day, some American law school first year contracts 
classes study only the common law of contracts and do not give 
the the Uniform Commercial Code (”UCC”) much attention. 
Those who do include it, are forced to alert their students to the 
inconsistencies that exist among the states in interpreting it. In 
                                                U.S. National Report                                             33 
general, the technique of teaching a non-existent national law, 
means that there is no single authoritative text for state law. 
They do not study a single authoritative text for one state with 
a mind toward determining whether the state where teaching is 
occurring, ought to adopt that law.  
 
When law schools teach federal law, teaching does tend 
to promote a single national interpretation of that federal law. 
But federal law is, as we have seen, often only an overlay on 
state law. Yet it is an overlay that sometimes focuses on prob-
lems that are quite different from the same problems in state 
courts. For example, federal courts in so-called diversity juris-
diction cases consider only cases of at least $75,000. Procedures 
suitable for such larger cases are not necessarily suitable for 
smaller cases that the state systems address.  
 
 b. Law professors 
 
 Three of the nation’s first law professors, James Wilson, 
James Kent and Joseph Story, were also leading judges of their 
era and leading promoters of uniform national law. All three 
conceptualized—and Kent and Story actualized—plans for law 
commentaries designed to bring certainty and uniformity to 
law in America.  
 
For most of the nation’s history, through such commen-
taries, law professors have contributed positively to increasing 
harmony and uniformity in law. They typically played the 
leading role in third party legal harmonization through uni-
form laws, restatements and model laws. They typically serve 
as principal “reporters” for these projects. 
 
In recent years, however, many, if not most, law profes-
sors have turned away from activities that promote unification 
and towards more particularist pursuits. At elite law schools 
professors now prefer social science scholarship about law and 
rarely engage in doctrinal writing that might contribute to un-
ification of law. At non-elite schools professors prefer clinical 
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and other practical education to legal scholarship. Focused as 
this education is on local practice, it does little to promote un-
ification of law. 
 
 c. Admission to practice 
 
 Admission to practice is admission by component state. 
While some federal courts have their own procedures and 
some have special rules, the states are responsible for issuing 
licenses to practice law.  
 
 Testing for admission to practice is, however, only partly 
by component state. To a degree that varies among the states, 
they incorporate in their own testing procedure tests developed 
by a third-party, independent, non-governmental body, the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners.  
 
 All but two states, Washington and Louisiana, use the 
Multistate Bar Exam, for one day of their two-or-three day state 
bar exams. The Multistate Bar Exam consists of 200 multiple 
choice questions on the topics of contracts, torts, constitutional 
law, criminal law, evidence, and real property. These questions 
are not jurisdiction-specific but test issues that should have the 
same solutions in all states.  
 
 Louisiana does not participate, presumably, because its 
own legal heritage, while much influenced by the common law, 
has a predominantly civil law origin. So in core private law 
areas of contracts, torts and real property, its legal approaches 
differ from those of other states and are non-uniform. 
 
d. Post-Graduate Legal Education and Post-Admission 
Legal Training 
 
The United States has no independent legal research in-
stitutes comparable to the renowned Max Planck Institutes in 
Germany. American law schools do not have a tradition of 
scientific study of law and do not offer American law students 
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as a matter of course the opportunity to do doctoral work in 
law.59
 Where the federal government enters into a treaty obli-
gation, that obligation can create uniform domestic law. This 
can occur where the federal government may otherwise not 
have authority to act.
 They do offer American and foreign law students alike 
many opportunities for a fourth year of legal education in the 
form of studies for masters’ degrees. Often, these degrees have 
a particular subject matter focus. 
 
While practical training is not required for admission to 
practice, most jurisdictions now require practitioners partici-
pate in what is called “continuing legal education” (“CLE”) fol-
lowing admission to practice. Requirements vary state-by-state. 
Most CLE programs are independent of the law schools and are 
offered by bar associations, other lawyer associations or pro-
prietary bodies. While directed generally by practitioners with 
practice in mind, they are not apprentice-type programs. They 
take place in classroom settings. 
 
Graduate and continuing legal education in their rela-
tionship to unification of law tend to mirror law school educa-
tion. Graduate education tends more toward central, while con-
tinuing legal education tends more toward component state 
law.  
 
5. Influence of international law on legal unification  
 
60
 Such cases are rare and are likely to be all the rarer in the 
future. Since ratification of CISG, the Congress has shown in-
 There is no need for the states to take 
separate action. International law is American law. Thus when 
the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of 
Goods took effect, it became uniform law for all fifty states.  
 
                                               
59 The J.S.D., or S.J.D. (doctorate of juridical science), is not routinely offered or 
granted to others besides foreign jurists and American academics already holding  
teaching positions. 
60 See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
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creased hostility to treaties, such as CISG, that are self-
executing, i.e., that require no further legislation by Congress. 
Still, insofar as Congress adopts law, either through a self-
executing treaty or through legislation implementing a non-
self-executing treaty, the international law will become a uni-
form American law.  
 
Compliance with international legal obligations only ex-
ceptionally plays a role in unification and then a minor one.  
 
Voluntary international coordination play a role, but it is 
very minor. Although the United States participates in such vo-
luntary coordination, American legal institutions not infre-
quently ignore or even rebuff actual cooperation. 
 
 
IV. Institutional and Social Background 
 
1. Judicial branch  
 
a. Judicial review of federal and state action 
 
The United States Supreme Court polices whether either 
Congress or the states have impermissibly exceeded their re-
spective lawmaking powers. The procedure and substance of 
that review, however, contribute substantially to making 
American law non-uniform and uncertain. 
 
(a) The Court cannot review legislation before it takes ef-
fect; it has no authority of abstract review. Early in its history it 
created the “case or controversy” requirement. That doctrine 
demands that the courts may review the constitutionality of a 
law only when the law is applied in a concrete case. This delays 
resolution of these questions. Until overturned, laws are pre-
sumptively valid; the law-abiding must comply with them if 
they can. 
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(b) The Court does not have a monopoly of judicial re-
view of constitutionality; review is not concentrated. Lower and 
state courts may determine the issue of constitutionality. The 
Supreme Court reviews exercises of lawmaking powers only in 
the ordinary course of appellate decision making. Parties must 
raise constitutional questions in the first instance of proceed-
ings. Those courts cannot refer the questions to a constitutional 
court. The court of first instance may try to avoid the constitu-
tional issue. If it does reach the issue, the disappointed party 
must then appeal the decision. Since most cases raising an issue 
of distribution of power end up in an intermediate federal or 
state appellate court, an exercise of lawmaking authority may 
be upheld in one jurisdiction and not in another.  
 
(c) The subject of the Court’s review—perhaps because 
of the case or controversy requirement—tends to be application 
of the law to an individual case, rather than a validation or in-
validation of the law as a whole.  
 
b. Judicial review and harmonization of state 
legislation 
The United States Supreme Court is not authorized to 
interpret state law authoritatively. Only exceptionally—and 
then against substantial criticism—does it do so.61
                                               
61 See, e.g.,  Bush v Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 
U.S. 22 (1951). 
  
No single court has authority to interpret authoritatively 
the uniform laws that the states adopt. This is possibly the big-
gest deficiency of the Uniform Commercial Code and of other 
uniform laws. It has long been recognized. Issues of interpreta-
tion remain unresolved decades after the Uniform Commercial 
Code first became law.  
 
The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to resolve 
controversies between component states. Art. III, § 2. 
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 c. Dual court structures 
 
There are parallel state and federal courts in both first 
and appellate instances. The Constitution did not require, but  
it does authorize, such dual structures62
Most states now permit federal courts of appeals and 
some other courts
 out of fear that state 
courts would not enforce federal law. This system of competing 
competencies complicates coordination and wastes judicial and 
private resources. This waste is by and large accepted as a 
necessary evil.   
 
63 to “certify” to their state’s highest court 
questions of state law that may determine a cause and for 
which there is no controlling state law precedent. In New York 
the procedure has been available since 1986. From 1986 through 
the end of 2005 federal courts certified 71 cases to New York’s 
highest court, of which the court accepted 66. While there are 
reasons peculiar to New York that explain this very low rate of 
referral, New York’s experience tends to confirm this Report-
er’s impression that this procedure has not become a measure 
used routinely to promote uniformity and coordinate judicia-
ries.64
The central government cannot compel states to adopt 
legislation. Such compulsion would considered an infringe-
ment of the sovereign prerogatives of the component states. 
  
 
2. Relations between the central and component state 
governments  
 
                                               
62 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 
63 Whether other courts are allowed to certify questions varies by state. Other courts 
that may certify are federal district courts, federal bankruptcy courts and the highest 
courts of sister states. 
64 Advisory Group to the New York State and Federal Judicial Council, Practice 
Handbook on Certification of State Law Questions by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit to the New York State Court of Appeals (2nd ed. 
2006), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/Cert.pdf. The New York pro-
cedure is available only to the federal courts and may be used by them sua sponte 
only after a case has been fully-briefed and argued. At that point, certification is not 
a time-saver, but a time waster.  
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Nor, on the same ground, can the central government compel 
component states to execute central government law.65
                                               
65 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). The Printz decision is at odds with ear-
lier federal practice. The first Congress, in providing for implementation of the Con-
gressional power “[t]o establish a uniform rule of naturalization, art. 1, § 2, cl. 4, pro-
vided for state court application of that uniform law. An Act to establish an Uniform 
Rule of Naturalization of March 26, 1790, Statutes at Large, 1st Cong., 2nd Sess., 103. 
  
 
The component states and their government are not 
represented at the central level. They have not been since 1913 
(amend. XVII). Until 1912 each of the legislatures of the com-
ponent states (art. 1, § 3, cl. 1) selected two senators in the Unit-
ed States Senate. Since 1913 the people of those states have 
elected the senators directly.  
 
Component state representatives at the central level are 
elected by the people of the component states: senators by all 
the people in the state, representatives by districts.  
 
 
3.  Bureaucracy  
 
The civil service of the central government is separate 
from the civil services of the component states. There is no mo-
bility between the separate civil service systems.  
 
The lack of continuity in the upper levels of the bureau-
cracies—both of the central government and of the component 
states—is a significant hindrance to unification of law.  
 
4.  Social, regional and environmental factors  
 
 a. Social factors  
 
 In contemporary America social factors do not contri-
bute greatly to disharmony of law. Federal law affirmatively 
prohibits laws that discriminate based on race or ethnicity, 
which thus largely assures harmony in these areas.  
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The social factor with the greatest present potential for 
disharmony is gender-orientation. Although the Supreme 
Court in 2003 in Lawrence v. Texas66
In the past, social factors were much more productive of 
disharmony. Historically race was the most important.  Even 
after the Civil War put an end to the non-uniform law of sla-
very, the former slave states sought to preserve de jure social 
separation of people (segregation) through so-called Jim Crow 
laws.  In contrast, northern states generally did not require de 
jure segregation; some even prohibited de facto segregation. The 
result was substantial disharmony from state-to-state. Some 
states prohibited people of one race from attending school with 
people of another race; other states did not. Some states prohi-
bited people of one race from marrying people of another race; 
other states did not. Some states prohibited innkeepers from 
housing people of different races in the same facilities; other 
states prohibited innkeepers from not housing people of differ-
ent races in the same facilities. 
 invalidated state criminal 
laws prohibiting consensual sexual conduct among same sex 
couples, states continue to vary in their legal treatment of civil 
relationships among same sex couples.   
 
67  The Supreme Court’s decision 
in Plessy v. Ferguson,68 which validated separate (“but equal”) 
treatment of people based on race as consistent with the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, is today nearly 
as infamous as the Supreme Court’s Dred Scott decision, which 
held that Negros were not citizens of the United States.69 Not 
until nearly a half-century later, in 1954, in an equally famous 
decision, Brown v. Board of Education,70
                                               
66 539 U.S. 588. 
67 For a listing of the disparate laws as they stood in 1950, see STATES’ LAWS ON RACE 
AND COLOR (Pauli Murray, ed., 1950). American race and nationality legislation was 
of particular interest in Nazi Germany as a precedent for its own racist laws. 
68 163 U.S. 537 (1906) 
69 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).  
70 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 did the Supreme Court 
overturn Plessy. Subsequent to Brown the Court invalidated 
other state laws making racially-based distinctions. For exam-
ple, not until 1967 did it invalidate prohibitions on inter-racial 
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marriages (anti-miscegenation laws).71 While the Brown deci-
sion is widely regarded as a triumph of American (litigation- 
and case law-based) constitutional jurisprudence, it took a fed-
eral statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, to impose national un-
iformity.72
 Federal laws that made distinctions based on race prin-
cipally involved immigration. They did not create non-
uniformity of law, since immigration law is exclusively federal 
law. The national government’s responsibility for native Amer-
icans tended to minimize state legislation and hence non-
uniform treatment of that group.
  
 
 While most state laws distinguishing people by race 
were directed against persons of African descent, many found 
applicability to persons of Asian descent as well to Native 
Americans (American Indians). Some states also adopted laws 
specifically directed to persons of Asian descent. These too, of 
course, worked against uniformity of law.  
 
73
 Formerly, ethnicity played a significant role in creating 
disharmony in law among the states. Different states reacted to 
immigrants with different laws. Some states supported immi-
grants by facilitating immigrants’ use of their mother tongues; 
others sought to suppress such use.
   
 
74
                                               
71 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (overturning Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 
(1883). 
72 Pub. L. 88-352. See Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by 
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 440 
(1999). 
 Political considerations of 
the day often played a part. During World War I there was a 
wave of legislation prohibiting use of German and other lan-
guages. In 1923 in Meyer v. Nebraska the Supreme Court invali-
dated a state statute that prohibited teaching students in lan-
73 Although even here, there was some non-uniformity. In 1950 thirteen states prohi-
bited sales of liquor to Native Americans, five prohibited marriages of Native Amer-
icans to white persons, and three provided for separate schools. STATES LAWS ON 
RACE AND COLOR, supra note 67, at 19. 
74 For a catalogue and analysis of such legislation, see HEINZ KLOß, DAS 
VOLKSGRUPPENRECHT IN DEN VEREINIGTEN SYAATEN VON AMERIKA (2 vols., 1940-1942). 
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guages other than English.75
These different patterns of settlement have played a role 
in the uniformity and in the disharmony of the nations’ laws. 
Before the Civil War northern states were seen to prefer settling 
disputes by law, while southern states were thought to prefer 
duels pursuant to “codes of honor.” Massachusetts has long 
 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 put an 
end to laws discriminating on the basis of an individual’s place 
of national origin. But different states and jurisdictions still 
treat differently the extent to which public services are to be 
provided in English only or in additional languages.   
 
The candidacy of Barack Obama for the presidency of 
the United States well demonstrates that racial and ethnic dif-
ferences are of declining importance. It also demonstrates, 
however, that race remains more important than ethnicity. He 
is usually identified as a “black” candidate and only rarely as a 
“second generation Kenyan or African” candidate. 
 
b. Regional Factors 
 
 That different groups settled the United States at differ-
ent times and places has led to regional variations in law. These 
variations go back to the earliest days of the country. Massa-
chusetts was settled initially by Puritans from England, while 
Pennsylvania was settled by Quakers from England and Ger-
mans from the Palatinate. Maryland was settled as a refuge for 
Roman Catholics. Other southern states were settled by second 
sons of the English aristocracy and the enslaved African-
Americans they brought to tend their properties. In the Middle 
West, Missouri, Illinois, Iowa, Ohio and Wisconsin were much 
settled by Germans, while Scandinavians settled Minnesota. 
Utah was founded by Mormons fleeing persecution in New 
York, Illinois and Missouri. California was settle by Mexicans 
and by Americans seeking gold.  
 
                                               
75 262 U.S. 390. Justice Holmes would have upheld the prohibition [sic!]. See WILLIAM 
G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS. NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION, 
1917-1927 (1994).  
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been considered to have creditor-friendly laws, while Texas 
and Florida are seen to favor debtors.76
Laws controlling firearms vary enormously. Densely-
populated cities—using home rule authority—often have very 
 Missouri is widely con-
sidered to have stayed in the Union in the Civil War because of 
the strong hostility of the new German immigrants to slavery. 
Utah was admitted to the Union only when the Mormon inha-
bitants agreed to outlaw bigamy, which was permitted by their 
religion.  
 
How much these different patterns of settlement contin-
ue to contribute to disparate law is well beyond the scope of 
this report. It is a matter of social science. In terms of continu-
ing day-to-day influences on law, regional environmental vari-
ations, with only a few exceptions, are of more significance 
than are differences in ethnic or religious make-ups of the in-
habitants of different states. Only in areas of recent immigra-
tion is there a noteworthy possibility of material disharmony in 
law based on population characteristics. Even then, disharmo-
ny among the  states is likely to be limited to the availability of 
services in non-English languages.  
 
c. Environmental Factors 
 
Both the nature of the land and the patterns of settle-
ment contribute to significant differences among the laws of the 
states. In most of the West land is plentiful, but desert. In a 
desert, issues of water rights take center stage. On some west-
ern highways, livestock enjoy the right-of-way (“open range 
country”), while on eastern roads the owner is strictly liable for 
them. Rights to the seashore vary from state-to-state. 
 
More densely-settled areas were quicker to institute zon-
ing controls. But Houston, a large and sprawling Texas city of 
about two million people, still  has no formal zoning code. 
 
                                               
76 As we have seen in considering the homestead exemption in bankruptcy. 
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restrictive controls. Thinly populated states oppose controls of 
almost any kind. 
 
 
V.  Unification Scorecard  
 
See Unification Scorecard. 
 
 
VI.  Conclusion  
 
“Unification” does not well describe the legal system of 
the United States. Unification is found only when law is 
exclusively federal. In most areas of the law there are 
significant non-uniformities between state and federal law and 
among laws of states and of municipalities. The government 
presents the people not with one law, but with a multitude of 
laws. The people are left to sort out the various laws at their 
peril. 
 
Yet if law in the United States is not uniform, it is largely 
harmonized.77
In everyday life, the devil is in detail. The 
inconsistencies, while only in detail, nonetheless have very real 
societal costs. American lawyers spend inordinate time 
worrying which law applies and determining what that law is. 
 While there are numerous inconsistencies in 
law, only rarely are these inconsistencies substantive at a 
societal level (e.g., death penalty is some states, but not others; 
stringent control of firearms in some places, lax in others). 
Usually inconsistencies are in matters of detail only. These 
details can, however, be extremely important in individual 
cases (e.g., death penalty, statutes of limitation).  
 
                                               
77 Accord, E. Hunter Taylor, Federalism or Uniformity of Commercial Law, 11 RUTGERS-
CAMDEN L.J. 527, 531 (1980) (“In sum, likeness rather than exactness—harmony ra-
ther than uniformity—has been the history of the “Uniform” Commercial Code, as 
will inevitably be the result of any code or model act which must depend for its un-
iformity on state-by-state enactment.”) 
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For half a century, if not longer, American jurists have accepted 
these inefficiencies as “the price we pay for our federalism.”78
(1) Undermining respect for law. Law is realized when 
people abide by and enforce it. Numerous inconsistencies in 
law complicate abiding by law and enforcing it. Law-abiding 
begins to look like a game that only suckers play. In short, they 
strike at the efficacy of law.
  
 
This price is so-well recognized, that most lawyers 
simply assume that the system could not exist without it. In 
blissful ignorance of alternative solutions, they and the public 
at large do not regularly challenge this enormous waste. 
 
Less-well recognized, are other costs that some may 
debate, but that seem real to this Reporter: 
 
79
                                               
78 Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 380 (1958) (opinion by Frankfurter, J.). 
79 Taking a similar view, see Herbert Pope, The Federal Courts and a Uniform Law, 28 
YALE L. J. 647 (1919). 
  
 
(2) It little recognized that disparate laws are deficient 
laws. When all solutions are equally valid, none is preferred. 
When each component state goes its own way willy-nilly, no 
way is identified as the best way. Instead of one law being 
subject to careful consideration in drafting and improvement in 
application, many laws are haphazardly drafted and carelessly 
applied.  
 
(3) Disparate laws invite undue influence or particularist 
influence. 
  
To this Reporter, neither the recognized, nor the 
unrecognized costs seem worth paying. The cacophony of non-
uniform law should long ago have been replaced by the 
harmony of uniform or better national law. The legal system is 
indeed a lagging indicator. More than a century and a third ago 
one critic rightly noted:  
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[A]s the country has grown older, the people of 
the United States as a whole—in their personal 
relations—have become far more united and 
harmonious than have the various systems of 
State law by which their commercial and 
domestic interests are largely governed. For this 
reason the constant conflict of law which daily 
arises in the affairs of our national life, with its 
consequent uncertainties, is becoming an evil so 
serious that it must soon pass from the hands of 
the theorist to those of the practical statesman.80
                                               
80 HANNIS TAYLOR, AN INTER-STATE CODE COMMISSION (1881), reprinted in REPORT OF 
THE ORGANIZATION AND OF THE FIRST, SECOND AND THIRD ANNUAL MEETINGS OF THE 
ALABAMA STATE BAR ASSOCIATION 210 (1882). 
   
 
